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William Chanes Martinez*
Introduction
“Oh! How beautiful are our Emperor’s new clothes! What a magnificent
train there is to the mantle, and how gracefully the scarf hangs. No one
would admit these much-admired clothes could not be seen.”1
COVID-19 has thrusted the world into a global public health crisis not seen since
the Spanish Flu Pandemic of 1918.2 At the time of this writing, 85,229,481 positive cases
have been reported, with 1,845,408 deaths, across all nations.3 As the United States
reached the grim milestone of 400,000 COVID-19 deaths, casualties continue to rise and
have surpassed the World War II American fatality count.4 On December 11, 2020, the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) issued the first emergency use authorization
(“EUA) for a vaccine for the prevention of COIVD-19.5 Despite the arrival of the longawaited COVID-19 vaccine, a vast majority of the American public will likely not be
vaccinated until June 2021.6 This is why the implementation of proactive, populationbased testing strategies is essential to contain the pandemic as the United States begins
vaccine distribution.7
On February 29, 2020, the FDA issued guidance8 that authorized commercial,
academic, and government labs to develop and use self-validated COVID-19 tests prior to
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the agency’s review of their EUA requests.9 These types of COVID tests, known as
laboratory developed tests (LDTs), are a specific types of in vitro diagnostics (IVDs) that
do not require FDA approval before use on patient samples.10 After such validation, the
FDA required labs to notify the agency of their intent to submit an EUA request within 15
days.11
One company that took advantage of FDA’s rules was a Boston-based startup –
“Orig3n.”12 Early on in the pandemic, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
(MDP) selected Orig3n to develop a coronavirus test to be used at facilities across the
Commonwealth, including North Hill Retirement Community—a nursing home located in
suburban Boston.13 Relying on the Orig3n test After having used the Orig3n test for
months and receiving only one positive test, North Hill administrators were suddenly
informed that 19 staff members tested positive for the virus at the same time. 14 MDP was
called in to verify the results and discovered that all 19 results were false positives.15 The
Commonwealth launched an investigation and uncovered 383 false positives from the
Orig3n tests, which had been used by more than 60 nursing homes in the state.16
Secretary Azar announced, that the FDA would not require premarket review of
LDTs without notice-and-comment rulemaking on August 19, 2020 notwithstanding the
fact that HHS and its general counsel, Robert Charrow, were aware of reports that many
LDTs, like Orig3n’s tests, falsely detecting the coronavirus.17 HHS stated that its
9
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announcement was consistent with then- President Donald Trump’s executive orders aimed
at reducing administrative regulation.18 While this announcement was made in the context
of the COVID-19 pandemic, the agency’s decision has direct implications for all LDTs,
not just devices used to detect the coronavirus.19
There is little question that individuals will suffer harm as a result of the
information they receive from the wildly inaccurate diagnostic tests currently on the
market. The FDA acknowledges that the underreporting of inaccurate results from LDT
diagnostic tests is “rampant,” as expects labs are required to report on themselves.20 As
the Orig3n example shows, these companies are ill-suited to self-regulate. The FDA should
not abdicate its role in protecting the public from faulty medical devices. As the death toll
climbs in the United States and states race to distribute the vaccine, accurate testing is
crucial to minimize the impact COVID-19. To achieve this, the FDA must be empowered
to do its job and regulate all in vitro diagnostic tests, including LDTs.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the
regulatory scheme for IVDs and FDA’s attempts to regulate LDTs. Part II shines a light
on Theranos—a Silicon Valley-based diagnostic testing company. Part III concludes by
calling on the FDA to regulate LDTs and rebukes arguments that FDA lacks jurisdiction
over LDTs.
I.

Current Regulatory Scheme for In Vitro devices

a. Overview of In Vitro Device Regulation
In 1938, Congress passed the FDCA.21 The Act gave FDA jurisdiction over
medical devices but did not give the agency authority to review them for safety and
effectiveness prior to market entry.22 Accordingly, FDA relied heavily on post-market
judicial remedies by bringing federal district court actions against device manufactures that
had violated the FDCA’s misbranding and adulteration provisions. 23
After nearly 40 years of minimal medical device regulation, Congress granted
FDA the authority to regulate the development, introduction, and marketing of medical

centers -- can distribute them without the need to first submit documentation for a premarket review
process.”).
18
Id.
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Id. at 1194.
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Id.: see also United States v. Article of Drug, 414 F. Supp. 660, 661 (D.N.J. 1975) (the FDA
instituted an enforcement action against a pregnancy test kit sold for at home use. The agency
claimed that this in vitro diagnostic test, consisting of vials of sodium hydroxide and hydrochloric
acid, was a new drug under the provisions of the FDCA. A “new drug” is defined as: “[a]rticles'
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or other
animals are ‘drugs,’” and, thus, require the manufacturer to file a new drug application with the
agency to determine its safety and effectiveness. The district court rejected this argument,
concluding that the definition did not apply to the testing kit “because its purpose is to indicate the
existence or non-existence of pregnancy, which is not of itself a disease.”); HUTT, supra note 21, at
1211.

3

devices through the enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA).24 The
MDA amended the FDCA’s definition of “device” to include “in vitro reagent” to the list
of articles categorized as devices.25 The statute defines a “device” as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in
vitro reagent, or other similar or related article . . . intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man . . . or intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body . . ..26 (emphasis added).
An in vitro diagnostic device is further defined as:
reagents, instruments, and systems intended for use in the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, including a determination of the state of health,
in order to cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease or its sequelae. Such
products are intended for use in the collection, preparation, and
examination of specimens taken from the human body. 27
FDA organizes medical devices into three classes (e.g., Class I, II, III) based on
the safety concerns associated with the device and the level of control needed to provide
reasonable assurance of the device’s safety and effectiveness.28 With respect to pre-market
regulation, Class I and Class II devices typically are “cleared” via FDA’s 510(k) premarket notification process.29 That process requires the manufacturer to notify FDA of its
intent to market a device that is “substantially equivalent” to another device that FDA
already has cleared/approved for market.30 Class III devices are subject to Pre-Market
Approval (PMA)—the most stringent type of FDA device marketing application. 31 The
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21 C.F.R. § 809.3(a) (2020).
28
Class I devices are medical devices that present relatively few risks to human health or safety,
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379 (2011).
30
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FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 227 (Kenneth R. Pina & Wayne L. Pines, eds., 6th
ed. 2017).
31
Id. at 235.
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PMA process is intended to provide FDA “reasonable assurance” of the safety and
effectiveness of these sorts of medical devices.32
To be approved or cleared, IVDs must demonstrate safety and effectiveness
through analytical and clinical validation.33 Analytical validation focuses on a test’s ability
to correctly and reliably measure a specific chemical compound, hormone, or genetic
marker in a given sample.34 Clinical validity refers to a test’s accuracy in predicting the
presence of, or risk for, a given condition.35
LDTs are IVDs that are “designed, manufactured and used within a single
laboratory.”36 The FDA is clear that the FDCA definition of a device applies equally to
IVDs manufactured by conventional device manufacturers, as well as those manufactured
by laboratories.37 Thus, the FDA has the regulatory authority to require pre-market
approval, or 510(k) clearance, of LDTs.38 However, since the implementation of the MDA,
the agency has exercised enforcement discretion, meaning that the agency has decided not
to enforce applicable provisions of the FDCA, as well as other FDA regulations, with
respect to LDTs.39
b.

Enforcement Discretion

Pursuant to the Section 702(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, “agency
action . . . committed to agency discretion by law” is not subject to judicial review.”40
Thus, FDA enforcement discretion refers to the agency’s authority not to enforce certain
provisions of the FDCA.41
This much was clear in the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney, where
Justice Rehnquist wrote for a majority that upheld the concept of agency discretion by
rejecting a petition from death row inmates to compel FDA to enforce the “misbranding”
provisions of the FDCA. 42 In Heckler, a state planned to execute a death row inmate by
32

See HUTT, supra note 21, at 1211; see also Martinez, supra note 28, at 15 (“PMA applications
typically include extensive clinical trial results, bench trials, laboratory studies, animal studies, and
references to all standards relevant to a device’s safety and efficacy.”)
33
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Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. 1, 7 (2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/89841/download [hereinafter LDT Draft
Guidance]; see also What Are In Vitro Diagnostic Tests, and How Are They Regulated?, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 14, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs/2019/05/what-are-in-vitro-diagnostic-tests-and-how-are-they-regulated. With respect to
PMA application and IVDs, there are unique issues presented. To assure the consumer of safety and
effectiveness, approval of an IVD PMA application focuses on the impact of the device’s
performance, and in particular on the impact of false positives and negatives results, on patient
health. See HUTT, supra note 21, at 1244.
34
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 33.
35
Id.
36
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37
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38
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39
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40
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Laboratory Developed Tests, 12 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 43, 50 (2019).
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lethal injection with a drug that FDA had not been approved for such a purpose.43 The
FDA Commissioner rejected the inmates’ the petition on the grounds that the agency lacked
authority to interfere in a state’s ability to carry out executions. 44 The FDA Commissioner
stated further, “[w]ere FDA clearly to have jurisdiction in the area, . . . we believe we would
be authorized to decline to exercise it under our inherent discretion to decline to pursue
certain enforcement matters.”45
The Court has recognized that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce,
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's
absolute discretion.”46 As such, the FDA’s decision not to take enforcement action is
presumed immune from judicial review.47 Because FDA refused to regulate LDTs in its
discretion, LDTs are primarily regulated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), pursuant to the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA),
which empowers to regulate laboratories that develop LDTs.48
c. FDA’s Recent Attempts to Regulate LDTs
In 2014, FDA issued a draft guidance document, explaining that the agency’s
“policy of general enforcement discretion towards LDTs [was] no longer appropriate.”49
The FDA contended that the CLIA regulations do not assure the safety and effectiveness
of LDTs.50 For example, FDA has serious concerns about the lack of clinical validity data
of LDTs, which is not evaluated under CLIA, and has acknowledged this oversight may
“potentially put patients at risk of missed or incorrect diagnosis, failure to administer
appropriate treatment or administration of potentially harmful treatment with no benefit.”51
The FDA also was concerned with CLIA’s review of analytical validation of LDTs. 52
While the FDA’s review of analytical validation occurs prior to market entry, CLIA’s
review occurs after the device is already in diagnostic use.53 Accordingly, “compliance
with CLIA regulations alone does not adequately protect patient safety.”54 The FDA
proposed a “risk-based approach” to regulate LDTs.55 Under the proposal, almost every
LDT would be subject to some level of premarket approval/clearance.56 However, on

43

Id. at 823.
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45
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See id. at 831.
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48
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50
Id. at 9.
51
Id. at 9.
52
Id.
53
LDT Draft Guidance., supra note 33, at 9.
54
Id. at 8–9.
55
Id. at 11.
56
Id. at 11–14; see also Parker, supra note 24, at 65. While the proposal laid out some exceptions,
many LDTs would be subject to the same risk-based classification systems to which all medical
devices are subject under the FDCA. Class III LDTs would be subjected to the more stringent PMA
process, Class II LDTs would be required to submit a 501(k) application, and Class I LDTs would
be subject to FDA discretion for approval through the 501(k) pathway as well. Id.
44

6

November 18, 2016, the FDA changed course and, thus, left the matter to Congress and
the incoming Trump Administration.57
II.

The Fall from Grace – Elizabeth Holmes and Theranos
"I have done something, and we have done something, that has changed
people’s lives. . .. I would much rather live a life of purpose than one in
which I might have other things but not that." 58

Elizabeth Holmes envisioned a way to perform multiple assays with a single, small
blood sample and then wirelessly deliver the test results to a doctor.59 Holmes’s idea
manifested itself in the founding of $9 billion dollar blood testing start-up Theranos.60
Theranos’s stated mission was to revolutionize medical laboratory testing through
innovative methods—utilizing a blood test that could help detect dozens of medical
conditions, from high cholesterol to cancer, based on a drop or two of blood drawn with a
pinprick from your finger and collected in a device called the “nanotainer.”61 Holmes’s
contended that the blood-analysis device, which she named “Edison,” would “quickly and
accurately analyze blood samples collected in nanotainers.”62
Holmes was herald as the next Steve Jobs—the founder of a company “promising
a health care revolution.”63 Holmes subsequently raised $6 million in funding, on the
condition that she would not disclose how her technology actually worked.64 In 2013,
Theranos announced a partnership with Walgreens and began to offer its blood tests to the
public at Theranos “Wellness Centers” located inside Walgreens retail locations.65
Because Theranos did not sell its Edison devices to Walgreens, FDA approval was not
required prior to market entry.66
On October 16, 2015, the Wall Street Journal published an article alleging that
Theranos was not what it seemed.67 According to the Journal, the Edison device could

57

Shiela Kaplan, FDA puts off closing lab-test ‘loophole,’ leaving decision to Congress and Trump,
STAT NEWS (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/18/fda-lab-test-loophole/.
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Ken Auletta, Blood, Simpler: One Woman’s Drive to Revolutionize Medical Testing, THE NEW
YORKER (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/15/blood-simpler (quoting
Elizabeth Holmes, former CEO and Founder of Theranos).
59
Id.
60
Nick Stockton, Everything You Need to Know About the Theranos Saga So Far, WIRED (May 4,
2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/everything-need-know-theranos-saga-far/.
61
Id.; see also Indictment ¶¶ 4, 5, United States of America v. Elizabeth A. Holmes and Ramesh
“Sunny” Balwani, No. CR 18-00258 LHK NC, 2018 WL 3216817 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
62
Stockton, supra note 60; see also Indictment ¶ 5, United States of America v. Elizabeth A. Holmes
and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani, No. CR 18-00258 LHK NC, 2018 WL 3216817 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
63
Stockton, supra note 60.
64
Nick Bilton, How Elizabeth Holmes’s House of Cards Came Tumbling Down, VANITY FAIR (Sept.
6, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-exclusive.
65
Theranos and Walgreens Expand Diagnostic Lab Testing to the Phoenix Metropolitan Area, BUS.
WIRE (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20131113005513/en/Theranosand-Walgreens-Expand-Diagnostic-Lab-Testing-to-the-Phoenix-Metropolitan-Area.
66
Stockton, supra note 60.
67
John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled With Its Blood-Test Technology, WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-blood-tests1444881901; see also Stockton, supra note 60.
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“not detect enough molecules in blood samples to provide accurate readouts.”68 On March
18, 2016, CMS warned Theranos that it was not in compliance with CLIA regulations.69
CMS stated that Theranos’s deficiency posed “immediate jeopardy to patient health and
safety.”70 In the report, CMS found that Theranos continued to run important blood tests
on 81 patients in a six-month period despite erratic results from quality-control checks
meant to ensure the test’s accuracy.71 In an attempt to comply with CLIA regulations,
Theranos issued “tens of thousands of corrected blood-test reports to doctors and patients,
voiding some results and revising others.”72 Nonetheless, CMS revoked Theranos’ CLIA
operating license and banned Holmes from owning or operating a medical laboratory for
at least two years.73 These events culminated with the dissolution of Theranos and an
eleven-count indictment—charging Holmes and Sunny Balwani, the company’s President,
with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and wire fraud. The indictment alleges that Holmes
and Balwani misrepresented the revolutionary potential of the Edison and defrauded
investors in the process.74

68

Carreyrou, supra note 67; see also Stockton, supra note 60. Two weeks after the Wall Street
Journal article was published, the FDA released reports calling Theranos’ nanotainer an “uncleared
medical device.” Sara Ashley O’Brien, FDA calls Theranos vial an “uncleared medical device”,
CNNMONEY (Oct. 27, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/10/27/technology/theranos-fdareports/index.html; see also Mary R. Hole et al., Theranos Form FDA-483 Report, (Sept. 16, 2015),
at 1, https://www.fda.gov/media/94712/download. FDA’s inspection report noted Theranos’
“[nanotainer] blood specimen collection device . . . is a Class II medical device. . . you are currently
identifying it as a Class I exempted medical device. . . you are currently shipping this uncleared
medical device in interstate commerce.” Id. Yet, FDA made no indication that it would regulate
the Edison device.
69
Rebecca Robbins, Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes faces possible government ban, STAT (Apr.
13, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/04/13/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-ban/; see Letter from
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to Elizabeth Holmes et al., on Proposed Sanctions
pursuant to the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (March 18, 2016) (available
at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/cms20160412.pdf).
70
Id.
71
John Carreyrou & Christopher Weaver, Theranos Ran Tests Despite Quality Problems, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-ran-tests-despite-qualityproblems-1457399479.
72
John Carreyrou, Theranos Voids Two Years of Edison Blood-Test Results, WALL STREET J. (May
18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-voids-two-years-of-edison-blood-test-results1463616976.
73
Megan Thielking, Theranos CEO banned from blood test industry for two years, STAT (July 8,
2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/07/08/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-banned/.
74
See U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California, Theranos Founder and Former
Chief Operating Officer Charged In Alleged Wire Fraud Schemes, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (June 15,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/theranos-founder-and-former-chief-operating-officercharged-alleged-wire-fraud-schemes; see also Indictment ¶¶ 19-28, United States of America v.
Elizabeth A. Holmes and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani, No. CR 18-00258 LHK NC, 2018 WL 3216817
(N.D. Cal. 2018). Theranos exemplifies the need for the FDA to regulate LDTs prior to market
entry. A false positive or false negative result can have significant impacts on patient health. For
example, Ms. Ackert ordered a Theranos test to assess possible side effects related to her breastcancer treatment. See Christopher Weaver, Agony, Alarm and Anger for People Hurt by Theranos’s
Botched Blood Tests, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-patientshurt-by-theranos-1476973026. Ms. Ackert’s Theranos lab report indicated a high level of an
estrogen hormone called estradiol, which was an indication of a possible rare adrenal tumor or an
elevated risk of breast-cancer reoccurrence. Ms. Ackert’s sister said, “she wasn’t the same,” after
receiving the news. Ms. Ackert’s oncologist ordered another test from a different testing company,
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III.

A Call to Action

When the FDA issued its 2014 guidance proposing a “risk-based” classification
system for LDTs, Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, then-Director of FDA’s Center for Devices and
Radiological Health, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce to explain the risk of underregulated LDTs and undetected
inaccurate test result.75 The clinical laboratory industry pushed back. At the time,
American Clinical Laboratory Association President Alan Mertz said, “the FDA lacks the
statutory authority to regulate laboratory developed testing services and likens its attempt
to define a lab test as a medical device to trying to fit a round peg into a square hole.”76
Many in the industry, and other legal scholars, contend that LDTs are a “service” provided
by laboratories and not medical products subject to FDA jurisdiction.77
The MDA authorizes the FDA to regulate the marketing and sale of medical
devices. The MDA explicitly amended the FDCA include “in vitro regent” on the list of
articles categorized as devices.79 As defined above, LDTs fall squaring into the definition
of in vitro devices because they are “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, including a determination of the state of health, in order to cure, mitigate, treat,
or prevent disease.80 Under the expressio unius canon of statutory interpretation, the
expression of items in a list excludes those items not listed.81 The Supreme Court has noted
that this canon applies where “circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term
78

which reported that her estradiol level was “less than 2 picograms per millimeter, compared with
313.5 picograms in Theranos’ test result. That was the level her doctors expected.” Id.
75
Dr. Shuren noted, “[A] false-positive test result that is not detected could lead to harm from
unnecessary medical procedures, delay of necessary medical procedures, and emotional distress. A
false-negative result that is not detected could lead to injury, and even death, from unchecked
progression of disease, and could have serious public health ramifications from the preventable
transmission of infectious disease.” Hearing on Examining the Regulation of Diagnostic Tests and
Laboratory Operations Before the Subcomm. On Health and Comm. On Energy and Commerce,
113th Cong. 3-4 (2014) (statement of Jeffrey Shuren, M.D., J.D., Director, Centers for Devices and
Radiological
Health,
U.S.
Food
&
Drug
Admin.),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/20151117/104127/HMTG-114-IF14-Wstate-ShurenJ20151117.pdf.
76
ACLA in Comment Letter: FDA Lacks Statutory Authority in Ill-Advised Move to Regulate
Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs) As Devices, AMERICAN CLINICAL LABORATORY ASSOCIATION
(Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.acla.com/acla-in-comment-letter-fda-lacks-statutory-authority-in-illadvised-move-to-regulate-laboratory-developed-tests-ldts-as-devices/.
77
Id.; see, e.g., Barbara J. Evans & Ellen Wright Clayton, Deadly Delay: The FDA’s Role in
America’s Covid-Testing Debacle, 130 YALE L.J. FORUM 78, 80–81 (2020) (“Section 564 allows
the FDA to grant EUAs only for medical products, which the statute defines as “drug[s], device[s],
or biological product[s]. It grants no new powers for the FDA to regulate clinical laboratory services.
. . . The FDA is charged with regulating the ‘test itself’ but not the ‘learned expert[s]’ who use the
test to provide laboratory services and, historically, has displayed careful respect for the
distinction.”).
78
Parker, supra note 24, at 65.
79
See HUTT, supra note 21, at 1211.
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Laboratory Developed Tests, supra note 10.
81
See Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002); see also Brandon Willmore et al., Can
Trump Order the FDA to Approve a Treatment for Unscientific Reasons?, LAWFARE (Oct. 28,
2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-trump-order-fda-approve-treatment-unscientific-reasons.
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left out must have been meant to be excluded.”82 Thus, the list articulated by Congress is
clear—the FDA is empowered to regulate in vitro medical devices, regardless of where the
device is developed. The FDA can and must regulate LDTs prior to market entry;
arguments to the contrary lack merit.83
FDA has statutory jurisdiction over LDTs and attempts by the executive branch to
circumvent FDA’s regulatory oversight amounts to usurping Congress’ legislative
authority. While the FDCA authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations to enforce
the statute, Congress also delegated such power to the FDA Commissioner.84 Accordingly,
Secretary Azar’s August 19, 2020 announcement requiring FDA to undergo notice-andcomment rulemaking in order to regulate LDTs is troubling.85 Along similar lines, on
September 15, 2020, Secretary Azar announced barred the FDA from signing any new
rules without his approval, thus, “[a]ny prior delegation of rulemaking authority, including
the authority to sign or issue a rule or a proposed rule, [was] rescinded.”86
HHS claims that it has taken these actions to remain consistent with then- President
Donald Trump’s executive orders aimed at reducing administrative regulation.87 Article II
directs the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”88 The President,

82

See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 81.
Opponents will cite new legislation as grounds that FDA “might lack authority” to regulate LDTs.
Evans, supra note 77, at 83. On March 5, 2020, Congress introduced the Verifying Accurate
Leading-edge IVCT [in vitro clinical test] Development Act (VALID), which would clarify FDA’s
authority over LDTs.83 Id. For example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 160 (2000), the Supreme Court relied on the FDA’s longstanding disavowal of regulatory
authority over tobacco and pointed to subsequently enacted tobacco-specific legislation that stopped
short of conferring authority to ban sale of the product, as Congress’ intent to not confer on the
agency the authority to regulate tobacco. Opponents may argue the same here, as the FDA has
chosen not to regulate LDTs and the VALID Act is currently being considered in Congress.
However, unlike with tobacco, the FDA has always maintained the position that the agency is
empowered to regulate LDTs and has chosen to utilize its enforcement discretion. Moreover, the
FDCA already authorizes the FDA the regulate in vitro devices and makes no distinction between
LDTs or other IVDs. The VALID Act would further clarify this position. Relying on precedent,
opponents’ arguments that FDA lacks jurisdiction to regulate LDTs still fails.
84
See 21 U.S.C. § 379d (2020) (“The Secretary, acting through the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs, shall automate appropriate activities of the Food and Drug Administration to ensure timely
review of activities regulated under this chapter.”); 21 U.S.C. § 371 (“The authority to promulgate
regulations for the efficient enforcement of this Act, except as otherwise provided in this section, is
hereby vested in the Secretary.”).
85
McLaughlin, supra note 12; see also Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA), Rescission
of Guidances and Other Informal Issuances, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/testing/recission-guidances-informal-issuances-premarketreview-lab-tests/index.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2020); see also Howard, supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
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Sheila Kaplan, In ‘Power Grab,’ Health Secretary Azar Asserts Authority Over F.D.A., N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/health/azar-hhs-fda.html.
87
Id.
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U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. See also, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–
38 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (at one end of the spectrum, presidential authority is at its utmost
when the President acts pursuant to express or implied statutory authority. At the other end,
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acting through the Secretary, must ensure that laws are “faithfully executed,” and not
obstruct agencies from carrying out their Congressional mandates.89
Conclusion
The LDT loophole is not a loophole, but a crevasse in the law. There is nothing
ambiguous about the FDCA – it authorizes the FDA to regulate all in vitro devices. As
this Essay maintains, public health officials and patients need access to accurate diagnostic
testing in order to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. As the Orig3n and Theranos examples
show, the lack of FDA regulation over LDTs can lead to absurd and dangerous results.
While opponents to FDA regulation of LDTs argue that the agency lacks jurisdiction, the
plain meaning of the statute undermines that claim. No group, be it the President, his
agents, or private interests, should inhibit the FDA from doing its job—ensuring the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices.

Azar’s actions, with influence from President Trump, appear to conflict with the FDA’s governing
statue, placing these actions in Jackson’s “lowest ebb” category.
89
Nonetheless, proponents of the Secretary and the President’s actions might argue, under the
unitary executive theory, that once Congress grants an agency decision-making discretion, the
President can direct the agency’s outcome. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The President as Scientistin-Chief, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565, 585 (2009). This author argues that administrative agencies,
like the FDA, are agents of Congress, despite being considered part of the executive branch. Once
Congress delegates power to an agency, the President serves as “a managerial agent for the
legislature rather than an independent source of domestic policy.” Id.; see also Morton Rosenberg,
Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive
Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 202–203 (1981). Following the unspoken assumption in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2006), the FDA is a scientific agency and must be protected
from political interference. See Gilman, supra note 89, at 596; see also Jody Freeman & Adrian
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007)
(“Expertise-forcing is the attempt by courts to ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free
from outside political pressures, even or especially political pressures emanating from the White
House or political appointees in the agencies.”).
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